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I. Introduction
Recent investigations on the regional distribution of trade flows
in the Asia Pacific area suggest that some countries have
developed strong bilateral trade links, while others obviously
tend to be more closely linked towards trading partners outside
the Asia Pacific area (Amelung (1990)). Moreover, empirical
findings indicate that there are groups (clusters) of countries
in the Asia Pacific area which - in relative terms - trade more
intensively with the members of their group than with other
countries of this area or the world. For instance, in the
eighties there was a clear separation between a South East Asian
group of trading partners comprising Singapore, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand and a group of North East Asian countries
encompassing Korea, Taiwan, Japan, China, Hong Kong and the USA
as a non-Asian nation. However, the cluster analysis does not
explain why this pattern of regionalization emerges. In economic
theory the regionalization of trade flows has been attributed to
the. discrimination of countries through legal (El-Agraa (1988),
Nienhaus (1987), p. 84) and natural trade barriers (Langhammer
(1983), Deardorff (1987)). Following Viner's custom unions theory
(Viner (1950)) a group of countries can negotiate preferential
•tariff treatment for their members, thus discriminating against
non-member countries. Given such an institutional arrangement
regional trade is expected to rise as a consequence of trade
creation and trade diversion. Moreover, regionalization of trade
flows can be enhanced by differences in transport costs resulting
from the spatial remoteness of trading partners. As Deardorff
shows, these differentials may affect both the direction and the
composition of trade, since they constitute natural trade
barriers.
However, the process of regionalization in Asia Pacific can
hardly be explained by preferential treatment and differences in
transport costs. Beside the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade
Arrangement, institutional arrangements such as the Bangkok
Agreement or even the ASEAN PTA have not been successful, as- 2 -
their impact on regional trade flows was negligible (Brockmann,
Hofmann, Rieger (1990); Amelung (1989); Wong (1988)).
Moreover, spatial distance between trading partners in Asia
Pacific is not likely to cause large differences in transport
costs that could explain a regionalization of trade flows. The
bulk of trade in the Asia Pacific area is due to sea transport
(Yeats (1981, 1982)). Transportation by ship is subject to quite
low freight costs, which are a function of distance, while the
major component of shipment cost is terminal costs. This points
to the fact that spatial distance between trading partners to
have a comparatively low impact on transport costs and on the
degree of regionalization.
Nevertheless, there are a few other obstacles to trade which may
lead to the regionalization of trade flows (see Table 1). These
obstacles are market imperfections in the sense of the neo-
classical model of perfectly competitive markets in general
equilibrium (Schenk (1982)). Such imperfections are sometimes
identified with transaction costs, even though this is not
strictly correct. The opportunity costs of obstacles or trade
barriers are measured by the gains from trade foregone. By
contrast, transaction costs are incurred, when the transactors
attempt to overcome these obstacles through market-making
activities (Casson (1982)). Such activities require the allo-
cation of resources such as labour, energy or capital (see Table
1). Hence, transaction costs are private costs for the trans-
actors and determine the profitability of trade from the firms'
perspective (Williamson (1979)) .
This paper focusses on the question whether differences in trans-
action costs across countries may affect the direction of trade
and the degree of regionalization in Asia Pacific. The second
chapter features the variety of transaction costs involved in
international trade and shows how differences in transaction
costs between countries may explain regional trading patterns. In
the third chapter these theoretical findings will be tested
empirically for the trade flows in the Asia Pacific region.- 3 -
Table 1: Classification of Marketing-making Activities
Obstacle to trade Marketing-making activity Major resource input
No contact between buyer and
seller
No knowledge of reciprocal wants
No agreement over price




Specification of the trade and
communication of details to
each party
Negotiation
Monitoring: i.e. screening of




Need to exchange custody of goods Transport
Tariffs, taxes on gains from
trade, price regulations,
quotas
No confidence that restitution
will- be made for default
Payment of taxes and tariffs.
Avoidance or evasion of taxes,











Source: Casson (1982).- 4 -
II. Transaction Costs involved in International Trade
International trade involves an exchange of goods, services,
information and capital between trading partners in different
countries. Such an exchange bears higher transaction costs than
domestic trade, as international trade differs from trade within
national boundaries in three ways. Firstly, international trade
is affected by the lack of enforceable laws. On the national
level such laws guarantee property rights for each transactor
engaging in an exchange of goods and capital. Individuals who
trade internationally run the risk of expropriation and wilful
default. For instance, an exporter may not be in a position to
enforce any legal action against a customer abroad, if the latter
refuses to pay in time. In the same vein, a bank extending a loan
to foreign creditors runs the risk of wilful default without
enforceable legal claims for compensation. Moreover, inter-
national trading partners deliberately expose themselves to
foreign exchange risk as international payments are due to other
currencies than the legal tenders of the trading partners. These
risks, which all can be hedged by respective insurance contracts,
add to the costs of international transactions, no matter if the
transactors buy an insurance contract or not.
Secondly, international trade can involve an exchange of goods
between two proportionally remote trading partners. On average,
the geographical distance between domestic trading partners
should be lower than between international trading partners. The
costs of moving goods or services over space can be expected to
rise with increasing distance. As a result, international trade
in goods and services can be subject to higher distance-induced
transaction costs than national trade.
Thirdly, trading in goods and services involves intense communi-
cation between trading partners. Especially, the gathering of
information or the bargaining and contracting inhibit costs both
on national and international transactions. However, costs of
communication are likely to be higher in international trade,
since on the national level there is a wide range of costless- 5 -
public information services. In addition, the exchange of
information tends to be more difficult when the trading partners
do not share a common ethnic and cultural origin. Hence, the
information requirements needed to engage in business with
foreigners are larger in international than in domestic trade.
Summing up, there are three factors determining transaction costs
in international trade, namely the lack of enforceable property
rights, the spatial distance between trading partners and the
lack of information goods. In order to determine in what way
these factors impact on the structure and the direction of
international trade, a more detailed analysis of the various
kinds of transaction costs is needed.
Following Vahlne and Wiedersheim-Paul (1977) international trade
in goods and services involves three kinds of transactions namely
flows of goods, capital and information. Each of these trans-
actions are subject to various transaction costs as they are
given in Table 2.
a") Communication and Information Costs
Communication and information costs encompass all resources which
domestic firms allocate towards the gathering of information on
firms, products and foreign countries (information costs) as well
as the processing and supply of information to the foreign market
and trading partner (costs of dissemination). The processing of
information facilitates an orderly decision-making process on
part of the trading partners (Bates (1988)).
The collection of information on a foreign market is costly,
since many of its characteristics cannot be expected to be
generally known but have to be investigated. One crucial factor
that determines the availability of information is the govern-
ment's information policy. Many governments regard information
and its diffusion as a public good and therefore subsidize
institutions providing costless information or contacts between
trading partners. In this respect, the information policy of aTable 2: Overview on the Kinds of Transaction Costs in International Trade
Transaction costs
I
Capital transfer costs Costs of good transfer
I
Comnunication and information costs
Costs of capital
transfer barriers
















































country does also affect the direction of trade flows, since
these government information services focus on particular foreign
trading partners and products. This involves a discrimination
against products and markets which are neglected by the
government's information policy. In general, the government tends
to provide more information services on domestic than on foreign
affairs. Hence, domestic suppliers of goods have a natural
advantage in information costs vis-a-vis foreign suppliers, so
that differences in information sets can serve as natural trade
barriers (Ringle (1977), p.45)).
As far as information on foreign markets is not publicly avail-
able, firms wishing to engage in foreign trade have to investi-
gate this information on their own account. In general, such
investigations are inhibited by cultural, social, religious and
ethnic differences (see Caves 1971, p. 5). Hence, the information
cost intensity of trade for, a domestic firm exporting goods
depends on the country of destination. In case of a strong
cultural and lingual affinity between the home country of the
exporter and the importing country, costs of information and
information dissemination can be expected to be less relevant
(see Herrmann et al. (1982), p. 16). Basically, exporting firms
will prefer those foreign markets where they can rely on a
comparative advantage in information costs vis-a-vis firms from
other countries (see Bilkey and Tesar (1977) and Bilkey (1978)).
This may lead to a sequence of foreign market entry starting with
countries where information costs are lower due to cultural
affinity with the country of the exporter (Carlson (1977)). Since
cultural affinity is often very high between neighbour states,
there is reason to assume that in general foreign trade starts
off with neighbour trade.
Cultural affinity evolves as a result of long-term historical
processes facilitating cultural exchange, e.g. colonial occu-
pation and migration. In this respect, cultural similarity is
also a function of geographical distance, since in many cases
prohibitive costs of bridging distances have prevented large-
scale migration between remote countries. As a result, avail-- 8 -
ability of information and cultural similarity can be especially
high in neighbour states that have a historical tradition in
factor mobility and exchange of information and therefore engage
in trade. Even where high information costs may have existed
before, they have been gradually removed through historical
relations that make cultural barriers less surmountable and
enhance communication links between two countries (Herrmann et
al. (1982)). As a result of this time-consuming process, the
direction of a country's foreign trade may change rather slowly.
Due to these historical factors, one can hypothesize that there
is an inertia element in international trade as far as its
geographical concentration is concerned.
In addition to these historical aspects, there is also a short-
term self-propelling effect inherent in international trade,
since information costs may decline as a result of increasing
intensity of foreign trade and information exchange. If an
exporter enters a foreign market as a pioneer, he has to engage
in costly market making activities one of them being information
gathering. Since many information goods do not allow for a clear
exclusion of other users (Bates (1988)), there may be consider-
able spill-overs of knowledge and information to other firms in
the home country of the exporter. For these successors market
entrance is clearly less costly than for the pioneer, since the
successors behave as free-riders thus using costless information
investigated by the pioneer and taking advantage of his learning
costs.
Apart from the costs of gathering information, firms have to come
up for the costs of information transfer. The level of transfer
costs is highly dependent on the availability of a well-function-
ing infrastructure for communication. As a result of the techni-
cal progress in telecommunication networks, costs of information
transfer have been drastically reduced in the last two decades.
Nevertheless, a high degree of information transfer costs is
still dependent on the distance between trading partners, since
transactors use to satisfy a large part of their demand for
information through personal contacts. The latter are subject to- 9 -
travel costs that are a function of distance between trading
partners (Klaassen (1988), pp. 88-92) and the development of an
infrastructure required for passenger transport.
Beside gathering information, firms must also disseminate
information on their products and activities to their customers
in the foreign market. For instance, firms have to adapt their
marketing strategy for the foreign market and develop an
effective distribution network. Just like the costs of in-
formation collection, the adaption costs are affected by the
cultural similarity between the trading partners, since the
demand for certain products, i.e. food or textiles, is highly
dependent on country-specific tastes and customs. The costs of
adaption are also generally higher, if the firm exports hetero-
geneous goods, that are either service-intensive or subject to
high communication requirements, e.g. non-standarized investment
goods (Ringle (1977), Olson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1978), p. 6).
For this reason, many exporters have to become multinationals, as
these information services cannot be delivered by firms in the
importing country or treated as a seperate product.
Furthermore, the relevance of information costs is affected by
the size and the export orientation of the firms in a country.
Both the costs of collecting information and the costs of
adaption are fixed costs in the sense that the unit costs of
information tend to decline with increasing production (Herrmann
et al. (1982), p. 57). Hence, large producers exporting to
large and absorptive markets may experience considerable in-
formation cost advantages compared to smaller enterprises engag-
ing on a smaller foreign market. Moreover, the cost of adaption
should be lower in export-oriented enterprises, as these firms
can make use of their experience and skills that have been
accumulated in other foreign markets, if the knowledge is not too
country-specific (Caves (1982), chap. 2). Hence, the degree to
which information costs form obstacles to trade depends on the
size and the international experience of the industries in the
exporting and importing countries (Lall, Khanna, Alikhani
(1987)).- 10 -
Up to this point, it has been implicitly assumed that the
exporter has to bear the information costs. In practice, however,
it is not unusual that firms look for suppliers on an inter-
national market and are prepared to take over a large amount of
the information costs required. Given the lack of communication
networks and other market-making activities in many developing
countries, importers pay a higher share of the information costs
involved in North-South trade than in North-North trade. "As a
result, a high share of the mark-up paid for marketing services
in North-South trade may accrue to the importer. Depending on the
distribution of transaction costs, there may be different prices
of the same product on different markets.
b) Costs of Good and Capital Transfers
Apart from the costs of information, transactors have to pay for
the transfer of goods and capital. In this respect, a first group
of transaction costs comprises the cost equivalents of barriers
to trade and capital transfers, while the latter can be regarded
as a non-tariff barrier to trade. As the effect of these ob-
stacles on the direction trade has been broadly discussed in the
literature on the custom unions theory (e.g. Amelung (1989);
Balassa, Stoutjesdijk (1984); Orantes (1984); El-Agraa (1988)),
the further analysis will rather focus on transport costs and
risks in international trade.
Transport costs consist of two components: terminal costs which
are fixed cost components and freight costs which are a function
of distance between transactors. Differences in distance between
trading partners impact on the direction of trade, since standard
trade theory shows that producers prefer to market their products
within their regional entity in order to spend a smaller share of
their value-added on transport costs (Yeats (1981), pp. 15-17).
Earlier works, in location theory, e.g. Losch (1954), have
asserted that given increasing freight costs markets may reach a
maximum geographical extension, beyond which there is no demand
for the good because of prohibitive transport costs. Following
Deardorff (1987) transport costs are natural trade barriers in-li-
the sense that some goods and services may only be traded within
delimited regions thus being non-tradables outside the respective
region, while other goods are traded worldwide.
In general, the protective effect of transport costs share of
freight costs in total unit costs tends to be lower for goods
with a rather high value added, low weight and small size for
instance durable consumer goods and capital goods (Langhammer
(1987)). By contrast, raw materials and non-durables show a
higher intensity of transport costs. As Yeats has shown, there
are a number of countries that had to adjust their export struc-
ture because they faced a comparative disadvantage in transport
costs resulting from their remote geographical position. Yet,
there is another component of transport costs which is a positive
function of distance and value-added. The owner of the goods
transported have to take into account the capital costs of the
good for the period of transport.
Beside distance, there are some other factors that can affect the
level of transport costs. Transport costs between two countries
can be extremely high, when the infrastructure, i.e. railroad
tracks, roads, harbours, is not well developed. For instance
Yeats (1982) shows that the Philippines had little trade with
their regional trading partners, since the sea traffic between
the Philippines and the other ASEAN states was underdeveloped and
costly. The lack of infrastructure may lead to a phenomenon
called roundabout trade, which means that an entrepot trader acts
as an intermediary.
Moreover, there is a high fixed cost element in transport namely
the terminal costs. If the share of terminal costs in total
transport costs is very high, total transport costs per unit of
distance will fall considerably with increasing distance. The
terminal cost intensity of transport depends on the transport
equipment eligible for trade. For instance, terminal costs are
fairly low in road transport, while the freight rates are com-
paratively high. The opposite applies to sea transport, which
shows a high intensity of terminal costs. Hence, island eco-- 12 -
nomies which are heavily dependent on sea transport cannot
exploit comparative advantages due to geographical proximity to
its trading partners, since the geographical distance does not
necessarily reduce transport costs. However, differences in
freight costs can enhance regionalization, when neighbour states
share a border line that is quite long relative to the size of
the two countries. In this case, a higher share of bilateral
trade can be conducted via road or rail transport, so that small
geographical distance and lower freight costs may impact on the
direction of trade.
The equivalent of transport costs in capital transfers are the
transfer fees charged for the transfer of capital between two
countries. Given the technical progress in the banking sector,
distance has no impact on the level of transfer costs. However,
just like the transport cost the costs of capital transfers
depend on the availability of an infrastructure providing
market-making activities, i.e. a modern banking sector and
international communication networks (Thiessen (1988), Chap. 2).
Beside costs of goods and capital transfer, the risks of
expropriation and default form an important cost component in
international goods and capital transfer. Transactors of goods
and capital deliberately expose themselves to risks due to the
lack of enforceable property rights in international trade.
Contracting parties or their governments may take advantage of
this lack of enforcement and default in a contract. On one hand
the transactors can insure themselves against such risks. In this
case, the insurance premium determines the level of transaction
costs between trading partners.
On the other hand, the trading partners can engage in market-
making activities that increase the reliability of transactions,
and reduce the incentives for breaking contracts. This is done
through contractual arrangements that are much more complicated
than trade on the national level. Following North (1987) there
are basically three kinds of contractual systems, namely personalBibliothek
- 13 - aeslnstitutsfurWelfwirtschaft
exchange, impersonal exchange with third party enforcement and
impersonal exchange without third party enforcement.
Personal exchange relies on personal ties between trading
partners, like for instance friendship or family membership.
Given these ties trading partners have a large set of information
about each other, while defaulting in a contract can be sanc-
tioned by a loss of reputation making the defaulting party an
outsider without personal ties. Hence, the personal exchange is
not subject to high transaction and information costs, since
there is no need for an extensive checking the reliability of
trading partners and monitoring the default risk. Personal
exchange in international trade is positively affected by cul-
tural homogeneity of the trading partners. When the trading
partners have similar cultural roots, their moral attitudes are
likely to reveal much resemblance. This may add to the reliabili-
ty of the partners (North (1987)). Since such conditions prevail
especially in smaller geographical regions, personal exchange is
well-developed in regional and local trade. Moreover, personal
exchange is characterized by the frequency of repeat dealings.
As the change of trading partners causes substantial information
costs and risks to the transactor, there is a tendency towards
stable and long-term partnerships. Therefore, a system of per-
sonal exchange involves substantial barriers-to-entry for out-
siders (see Johanson and Mattsson (1987), p. 2, Carlson (1977),
p. 22). As the number of personal ties in a given area are quite
restricted, there are certain limits to the trade potential that
can evolve under this system of contracting.
By contrast, impersonal exchange is not a function of personal
relationships and thus facilitates a substantial expansion of
international trade. Impersonal exchange without third party
enforcement comprises all contractual arangements, in which
information and reliability is not given from the beginning and
which cannot be enforced by law. The risk involved in these
contractual arrangements is higher than in personal exchange. In
the same vein, transaction costs are higher than in the case of
personal exchange, since there are high costs of information and- 14 -
insurance. Under a system of impersonal exchange, foreign trade
evolves as a slow process starting off with small and few trans-
actions, as both trading partners have to prove their reliability
(Johanson and Mattsson (1987), p. 5). Large firms that are
internationally known and have developed a widely accepted
reputation find it easier to deal with impersonal trade without
third party enforcement than smaller enterprises, as the former
can afford considerable investment in early warning and monitor-
ing systems. Moreover, large firms are in a position to develop a
publicly known corporate image or brand name, which adds to its
reliability as a trading partner and serves as a substitute for
the gathering of information. In this respect there are consider-
able barriers to entry in impersonal exchange. Given these
barriers in personal exchange and impersonal exchange without
third party enforcement there is a high degree of inertia as far
as the geographical concentration of partnerships is concerned.
Impersonal trade with third party enforcement is another form of
contracting. In its purest form, transactors can enforce their
property rights in the country of their trading partners, even
though they are not located in that foreign country. However,
impersonal exchange with third party enforcement requires
extensive legal cooperation between authorities of two countries.
A precondition for such a cooperation is a bilateral adjustment
of law codes and a willingness for political cooperation. Given
this kind of institutional arrangement between two countries,
there is no difference between domestic trade within these
countries and bilateral trade between these countries. Yet, there
are two substitutes for this arrangement. Exporters can also set
up subsidiaries in foreign countries and thus become multi-
nationals that are legally treated as domestic firms in the
importing country. Hence, the firm substitutes the risks due to
expropriation of export goods and debt default for the risk of
corporate expropriation. The latter risk can be regarded as a
fixed cost element, while costs due to the former risk are a
function of the number of transactions. Hence, this substitution
may reduce transaction costs when the frequency of transactions
is very high.- 15 -
The alternative way to reduce risks of default is provided by
various document-against-payment schemes. The transaction of
goods and capital is partly taken over by reliable banks which
are paid for their international reliability in these trans-
actions. Apart from these documents-against-payment schemes
international banks provide a broad set of services (e.g. future
contracts, export factoring, swap deals) reducing risks and
transaction costs for individuals engaging in international
trade. Especially the risk due to the fluctuation of exchange
rates are major obstacles to foreign trade (Nsouli (1984)).
Hence, trade can be expected to flourish when there are well-
developed international banking systems in the home countries of
the transactors. A financial system facilitating a trading of
risks and monetary cooperation between governments constitute
market-making activities reducing transaction costs.
III. The Empirical Impact of Transaction Costs on the Direction
of Trade in Asia Pacific
As it was shown in the last section, there are a variety of
transaction costs -which are obstacles in international trade and
cause costs for transactors. Since these costs are not uniform
for all countries, it is very likely that differences in these
costs may affect the direction of trade. This may lead to a
regionalization of trade in the sense that there may be clusters
of countries that share low transaction costs and therefore
engage in intense bilateral trade relations.
This leads to the question, how bilateral trade links, that is
the variable to be explained in the following, can be measured.
In an earlier fact-finding study on regionalization in Asia
Pacific (Amelung (1990)), the export shares (EXP), i.e. the share
of export from country i to country j in total exports of country
i, were calculated in order to correct for the differences in
size among countries and show the relative importance of bi-
lateral trade links. On the basis of these export shares, it has
been shown that there are clear trends of regionalization in the
Asia Pacific area. Using regression analysis it will be tested,- 16 -
whether it is possible to establish a causal relationship between
these export shares and transaction cost for bilateral trade in
17 Asia Pacific countries, as they are listed in Table Al in the
appendix. However, the endogenous variable is subject to fluc-
tuation because of changes in export prices and quantities. For
this reason, export shares have been averaged on the basis of
export values for the 1981-1987 period.
a) The Model and Data Sources
As far as the exogenous variables are concerned, there is a
striking lack of data on transaction costs that enter the cost
calculations of transactors engaging in international trade. For
this reason one has to resort to proxies that can be derived from
the hypotheses discussed in the last section. The model that will
be tested for the Asia Pacific area comprises the following
variables:
Export = a + b± HIST + b2 CRED + b3 CUL + b^ EXST + b5 LAB
+ bc DIS + b_ CAP + bo BOR + bQ PCI + b. _ PROT
+ b1;L SIZE + b12 DASEAN + b13 DBANG + b14 DSPFT
The first variable is the historical level of export shares
(HIST). (Table Al in the appendix provides a complete lists of
all variables and countries.) It can be hypothesized that this
variable is positively related to the export values of the
1981-1987 period. There are two reasons for that. Firstly, it can
be argued that relationships between trading partners are fairly
robust due to high barriers-to-entry as a result of information
costs and risks involved in international trade. Secondly, trade
has a self-propelling effect, since information diffusion can
reduce information costs over time. The diffusion of information
occurs faster the more individuals have obtained that kind of
information. For this reason, information costs can be expected
to decline more rapidly between pairs of countries that have a
tradition in bilateral trade and and thus a high degree of- 17 -
information on the trading partners (inertia element in inter-
national trade). In an earlier study by Herrmann et al. (1982)
trade data of 1900 have been taken in order to explain the trade
flows between OECD countries in the seventies. The measuring of
historical trade flows is somehow difficult, since many countries
in the Asia Pacific area achieved their independence after the
Second World War. Statistical-data reaching back to the colonial
period are either not available or not reliable. For this reason,
export shares for 1966 have been calculated, as they can be
obtained from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.
The second variable (CRED) refers to sovereign risk involved in
international trade. The higher the reliabilty in transactions
the more trade can be expected to grow between two trading
partners. The credibility of trading partners can be proxied by
the debt default risk of the particular countries. The respective
country ratings ranging from 0 for bad debtors and 100 for good
ones have been derived from the publications of the Institutional
Investor. The CRED variable features the sum of these ratings for
the two trading partners in 1985.
Another risk component in foreign trade is due to exchange rate
fluctuations. The variable EXST measures the correlation co-
efficient of the two trading partners' exchange rate vis-a-vis
the US$. A high positive correlation coefficient would imply a
relative stability in the exchange rate movements of the trading
partners. The opposite is true for negative exchange rate fluc-
tuations, since in this case an appreciation of one currency is
accompanied by a depreciation of the other.
In order to capture the effects of barriers to capital transfers,
the percentage difference between the official and the black
market exchange rate was averaged on the basis of yearly data
from Pick's Currency Yearbook (now called World Currency Year-
book) for the period 1981-1986. It can be argued that this
percentage difference is higher the more exchange controls are
implemented. The CAP variable proxying the extent of capital
transfer barriers between trading partners was calculated as
follows:- 18 -
. 1986 b .. - e .
CAP. . = \ I Ji3 . . = \ I
13 t=1980
 ejt
where b. is the black market rate in the year t for the import-
ing country j and e. is the respective official or effective
exchange rate.
In addition, there are transaction costs resulting from tariffs
and non-tariff barriers. Since data on the implicit protection
for our sample of countries are not available, we took a dummy
variable PROT in order to capture the effect of protectionism on
foreign trade. These dummies have been derived from classifi-
cations of countries with respect to their degree of outward
orientation, as it is available in the World Development Report
1987 for the period 1973-1985. In this report a broad sample of
developing countries have been classified into various cate-
gories, i.e. strongly outward oriented, moderately outward
oriented, moderately inward oriented and strongly inward
oriented. The PROT variable shows the degree of inward
orientation for the importing country. The dummy equals 0 (1) for
strongly (moderately) outward oriented countries and 3 (2) for
strongly (moderately) inward oriented countries.
Preferential tariff treatment resulting from institutional
integration schemes was proxied by introducing dummies for their
member countries. DBANG equals 1 for the member countries of the
Bangkok Agreement in the sample (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India,
South Korea). In the same vein, dummies were introduced for the
ASEAN countries (DASEAN; Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines,
Indonesia, Thailand), the South Pacific Free Trade Arrangement
(DSPFT; Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea), and the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (DSAARC, Bangladesh,
India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan).
Moreover, the CUL variable measures the cultural homogeneity of
countries. As it was discussed in the last chapter cultural
homogeneity of trading partners reduces risks, costs of
information, marketing and bargaining. Hence the regression- 19 -
coefficient is expected to yield a positive sign. The index of
cultural similarity used in the regresssion was calculated as
follows:











where e... (e.?) is the number of population belonging to the
ethnic group k in country i (j). The data for the calculation of
the index have been obtained from the Fischer Weltalmanach (1985)
and refer to 1981 and 1982 depending on the particular countries.
Earlier studies, e.g. Herrmann et al. (1982) or Abebe (1980) have
tested the lingual affinity by analyzing whether the official
languages in pairs of countries are identified. Since English is
a widely accepted language in-Asia Pacific, it does not make
sense to test lingual similarity as communication costs are not
likely to evolve because of language problems. For this reason,
in this study the ethnic origin of the population was taken as a
yardstick in order to assess whether cultural similarity can
impact on personal ties, resemblance of customs and habits etc.
Next, two variables with a geographical dimension enter the
equation. The first one, DIS, measures the distance between the
main ports of the respective trading partners thus serving as a
proxy for freight costs. The distance variable has been measured
by using the Reeds Marine Distance Table. However, it has to be
noted that this variable implicitly measures other transaction
costs. For instance, communication is often subject to extensive
business travelling, which costs more the larger the distance is.
Moreover, it is likely that cultural homogeneity is correlated
with geographical distance, since historical migration is func-
tion of geographical distance.
The other geographical variable, BOR, attempts to proxy the
relevance of border trade due to geographical conditions. If two
nations share a border which is very long relative to their size,- 20 -
there is a high potential of regional trade, since road and rail
transport is more important. The proxy for geographical con-
ditions facilitating such border trade is defined as follows:
BOR. . = —r^ ID K±
where L.. is the length of the border line between the two
trading partners (country 1 and country 2), while A. is the total
area of the exporting country i. Since many of the countries in
the Asia Pacific area are so-called island economies, borders
were also assumed to exist between countries, when the distance
across the sea between did not exceed 100 km. This is the maximum
range of small vessels with low terminal costs eligible for
regional trade. The length of the border lines have been measured
by using the world map published by the National Geographic Maga-
zine .
Yet, there are three control variables that can be expected to
add to the significance of the regresssion results. Two of them
(LAB and PCI) are related to trade theories. LAB proxies the
difference in factor endowments according to the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model. Accordingly, trade between countries is a result
of differences in factor endowments. A simple proxy for the
differences in the endowments with human capital and physical
capital is per-capita income (Havrylyshyn (1987)). A low per-
capita income is supposed to reveal a rather poor endowment with
physical and human capital. In order to have a control variable a
similar proxy was used in this study:
L./GNP.
where L. is the labour force of country 1, which is the labour-
abundant country, while L. is the labour force of the country
that is relatively scarce of labour. A high value of LAB shows
that there are tremendous differences in factor endowments
leading to higher intensity of trade between the two countries.- 21 -
Moreover, there is a potential for intra-industry trade (Linder-
type of trade), when both trading partners have reached a high
stage of development allowing for the diversification of the
demand structure. In order to capture this phenomenon, the per-
capita income of the trading partner with the lower income was
included as an additional variable PCI.
Finally, the SIZE variable corrects for the size of the coun-
tries. The export shares that constitute the endogenous variable
can be expected to be higher when the importing country reveals a
higher demand because of a large domestic market, high GDP per
capita and a free import regime. The SIZE variable features the
total import of the importing country in the period 1981-1987. It
has to be noted, however, that the SIZE variable comprises also
some determinants of transaction costs. As it has been argued in
the preceding section, there are several fixed cost components of
transaction costs that may cause a reduction of unit costs of
transaction given increasing trade volumes. Since large import
markets have a high potential for declining unit costs of re-
duction, we expect a negative relationship between the SIZE
variable and the relevance of transaction costs.
b) Empirical Findings
The results of the stepwise cross sector regressions can be
obtained from Table 3 on page 22 and 23. Altogether seven
equations were tested. This was necessary because there is a high
degree of multicollinearity between some variables (see Table A2
in the appendix). As a consequence, some coefficients are not
significant in some equations depending on the selection of
variables included. As it can be seen from the equations cultural
similarity (CUL), geographical distance (DIS), exchange cor-
relation (EXST) and credibility (CRED) of trading partners are
significant variables in most of the equations explaining the
direction of trade in the Asian Pacific area. Moreover, the past
trade flows as they are reflected in the HIST variable is highly
significant (equations 6 and. 7). This points to the fact that
trade relations reveal a high element of inertia in the geo-- 22 -












































































































































































































































Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues;
World Bank, World Development Report,
Institutional Investor, Country Ratings,
Amelung (1990)
various issues
various issues; Fischer Weltalmanach, various issues;
Pick's Currency Yearbook, various issues; National
Geographic Magazine, 1957 World Map; own calculations.- 24 -
graphical concentration of international trade. This supports
early findings on the stability of regional trade in Asia Pacific
(Amelung (1990)). Among the control variables, the coefficient of
the SIZE variable adds considerable explanatory power to the
equations 4-7.
The degree of outward orientation (PROT) and the proxy for the
barriers to capital transfers (CAP) attach significance to
equations 1, 2 and 3. The dummy variables indicating the
existence of preferential trading arrangements fail to add
explanatory power to the equations, except for DSAARC in equation
3 and DSPFT in equation 7. The latter variable, however, does not
yield the correct sign. DASEAN does not impact on the results,
though the coefficient of this variable is stable and yields the
correct sign in equations 3 and 7.
Moreover, the BOR variable does not seem to impact on the re-
gional direction of trade. This can be explained by the relevance
of sea traffic in the Asia Pacific and the lack of data on
regional trade, which is only partly registered in the national
statistics on foreign trade.
Finally, the LAB variable yields significant results in equations
1, 2 and 3, thus confirming earlier studies analyzing differences
in factor endownments. By contrast, PCI turns out to be insigni-
ficant, though it gives a correct sign.
The rather low explanatory value of equations 1, 2 and 3 points
to the fact that a better specification of transaction costs is
required, since it is mainly the SIZE and HIST variables adding
to the significance of the other equations. As trade barriers
between countries account for a large share in total transaction
costs, a better indicator for protectionism between countries
should be calculated. Moreover, a more careful specification of
differences in factor endowments may add to the signficance of
the equations. Finally, the availability of market-making activi-
ties in the particular country, i.e. indicators on average firm
size, multinationals and the development of financing services,- 25 -
should be taken into account. These extensions of the model
together with a more direct specification of transaction costs
provide opportunities for further research.
IV. Conclusions
The formation of regional entities characterized by strong
bilateral trade links has been attributed to preferential trade
agreements and differences in freight costs in the recent
literature. In this paper a broader concept was applied, as many
other obstacles to international trade incurring transaction
costs were included in the analysis. Given such transaction costs
(e.g. costs of information, bargaining and insurance) the
direction of trade is not only a function of relative differences
in production costs but also a function of differences in trans-
action costs across countries.
In order to assess to what extent these transaction cost dif-
ferentials affect trade flows, the bilateral trade between 17
countries in Asia Pacific was empirically analyzed. Summing up,
it can be concluded that the determinants of transaction costs
between trading partners have a considerable impact on the
direction of trade in the Asia Pacific area. Cultural similarity
among trading partners seems to enhance trade, as it easens
communication and thus reduces costs of information, bargaining
and marketing. Moreover, the credibility of trading partners and
the exchange risks involved in international trade have affected
the direction of trade among countries. Moreover the distance
between partners affects the opportunities of communication and
transport and adds to the transaction costs between trading
partners.
Hence, regionalization of trade in the sense that trading
activities within a group of countries is more intense than those
outside the group can be explained by the difference of trans-
action costs and their different speed of reduction. Especially
the separation between a South East Asian group of countries
(Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand) and a North Pacific group (Japan,- 26 -
USA, China, Hong Kong, Korea), as it was identified in an earlier
study (Amelung (1990)) can be explained by transaction cost
differentials because the criterion that was used for delimiting
those regions in Asia Pacific in that earlier study equals the
dependent variable in the regression analysis in this paper.
The case of the Asia Pacific area clearly shows that regional
entities are likely to evolve even without any progress in
institutional integration schemes especially when transactions
are low because of a common cultural tradition and geographical
proximity between the countries. Especially the latter deter-
minant seems to suggest, that economic regions can be delimited
within geographical areas, even though technical progress has
reduced costs of freight and communication substantially.
Moreover, policy variables seem to matter whether countries form
an economic region. A coordination of monetary policies reducing
exchange rate fluctuations between countries can help to lower
transaction costs and enhance trade. In the same vein, the
unilateral lifting of barriers for capital transfers and trade
may substantially reduce transaction costs in Asia Pacific arid
provide opportunities for regional trade integration.- 27 -
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Note: Dummy variables showing the membership preferential trading arrangements are not listed as the data can be
derived from the text.




































































































































































( 272) ( 272)
P= .322 P= .021
.0995 -.4256
( 272) ( 272)
P= .051 P= .000
.0566 -.0734
( 272) ( 272)
P= .176 P= .114
-.1276 .4386
( 272) ( 272)
P= .018 P= .000
1.0000 -.0767
( 272) ( 272)
P= . P= .104
-.0767 1.0000
< 272) ( 272)
P= .104 P= .
-.1287 .1570
( 272) < 272)
P= .017 P= .005
-.0529 -.2796
( 272) ( 272)
P= .193 P= .000
.1439 .1777
( 272) ( 272)
P= .009 P= .002
-.0275 ,0851
( 272) ( 272)
P= .326 P = .081
-.0401 . .2437
( 272) ( 272)
P= .255 P= .000
.1419 .0689
( 272) ( 272)













































CAP2 HIST2 SIZE3 PROT
.3873 .2238
( 272)"- ( 272)


























( 272) ( 272)
P= .000 P= .000
.1712 -.1572
( 272) ( 272)
P= .002 P= .005
-.0879 .0598
( 272) ( 272)
P= .074 P= .163
-.1101 .1014
( 272) ( 272)
P= .035 P= .048
.1439 -.0275
( 272). ( 272)
P= .009 P= .326
.1777 .0851
( 272) ( 272)
P= .002 P= .081
-.4154 .2936
( 272) ( 272)
P= .000 P= .000
-.2552 .1867
( 272) ( 272)
P= .000 P= .001
1.0000 -.1730
( 272) ( 272)
P= . P= .002
-.1730 1.0000
( 272) ( 272)
P= .002 P= .
-.2249 .5046
( 272) ( 272)
P= .000 P = .000
.6521. -.2245
( 272) ( 272)




























































































































(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / 1-TAILED SIG) IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED
Source: See Table 3.